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INTRODUCTION

In June 1990, The American Planning Association, a national Washington, D.C. based non-profit association of 27,000 professional planners, elected and appointed planning officials, and citizens interested in
improving urban and rural planning filed this amicus curiae brief with
the New Hampshire Supreme Court. The case on appeal is Wayne
Britton v. Town of Chester, No. 85-E-342 (N.H. Super. Ct. June 27,
1989), brought by a builder/developer and low-income plaintiffs in
need of affordable housing in Chester, New Hampshire.
In that case, the trial court, aided by a special master, found the
entire zoning ordinance of the Town of Chester to violate the New
Hampshire Constitution because of its exclusionary characteristics
which made the construction of affordable housing for low- and moderate-income families impossible. In invalidating the Chester zoning ordinance, the trial court imposed a "builder's remedy" which allowed
the builder/developer to construct forty-eight units of multi-family
townhouse units, ten of which would be set aside for low- and moderate-income families for a period of at least twenty years without interference by the town. The trial court applied the principles originated
by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the famous Mount Laurel cases, a
series of anti-exclusionary zoning decisions in the 1970s and 1980s
which held that municipalities which enact land use regulations have
an affirmative obligation under the state constitution to provide realistic opportunities in their zoning ordinances for moderate- and low-income housing on a regional fair share basis.
The amicus brief was a group effort, written over a period of three
months by a national committee of attorneys and planners. It describes the problem of exclusionary zoning to the New Hampshire
Supreme Court-particularly why it is so intractable-and analyzes
the Town of Chester's regional setting, planning context and regulatory
framework. It next reviews New Hampshire land use decisions and
statutes and traces the development of anti-exclusionary zoning rulings
in other states. It exposes the court to the regional general welfare
theory which underpins anti-exclusionary zoning litigation: when a
zoning ordinance strongly influences the supply and distribution of
housing over a region, a court must consider the welfare of that region
in gauging the constitutionality of the ordinance. Finally, it suggests to
the court how to shape the "builder's remedy" to insure that moderateand low-income families are benefitted and housing for them actually
gets built.
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As of this writing (April 1991), a decision is pending by the New
Hampshire Supreme Court.
Stuart Meck
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. The exclusionary zoning challenged in this matter is a nationwide problem shared by municipalities in high growth areas such as
southeastern New Hampshire. These municipalities use their planning
and zoning powers in such a way that discrimination against low-income and sometimes minority households is the direct result. The primary causes are dislike of the poor, racial prejudice and dependence on
the local property tax. The practice is almost wholly created by
"state" action. Studies of state and local political systems indicate that
legislative solutions will not be forthcoming without judicial intervention. Chester is an exclusionary municipality.
2. The New Hampshire Legislature has begun to address the problem, through statutes encouraging regional planning and "innovative"
land use measures, and by addressing the problem of manufactured
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housing. This court has limited the power of towns to exclude the "unwanted," be they mentally, physically or economically disadvantaged.
The relief sought by the plaintiffs in this matter is consistent with the
precedents of this court and the policies articulated by the legislature.
3. Other states have also recognized this problem and have crafted
solutions, most notably the Mount Laurel doctrine. The New Hampshire legislature and courts have taken note of these solutions. The
Chester case presents an opportunity to draw on the experience of
other states to fashion an effective judicial remedy that is appropriate
to New Hampshire.
4. Once it is understood that state action is the source of the problem, it follows that the constitutional concept of regional general welfare, accepted in New Hampshire and other states, requires each
community to provide for its fair share of the needed low-income housing. This approach is entirely consistent with protection of environmentally sensitive land.
5. The ultimate solutions are legislative, not judicial, but the courts
must rule forcefully so that legislators will respond.
6. Total invalidation of the ordinance is usually not appropriate.
Ordinance revision, supervised by a master, may be sufficient. Fair
share methodologies are readily available, and inclusionary zoning will
attract builders willing to provide lower income units, but the
"builder's remedy" can cause difficulties. The best planning solutions
will occur if litigation by public interest groups is encouraged, with the
"builder's remedy" awarded only sparingly. Award of attorney's fees
and costs should be given careful consideration.
ARGUMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION:

THE INTEREST OF APA

The American Planning Association (APA), a national, non-profit
association of 27,000 practicing city planners, elected and appointed
planning officials, and citizens (including a northern New England
chapter, which endorses the filing of this brief), has developed a special
research expertise in the relationship of sound land use planning to the
availability of low- and moderate-income housing.' In 1986, APA's
1. One of APA's predecessor organizations, the American Institute of Planners,
published the country's first monograph on fair share regional housing planning. See
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel 1),
67 N.J. 151, 216, 336 A.2d 713, 747 n.17 (Pashman, J., concurring) (citing BERTSCH &
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Board of Directors specifically directed that it take legislative and legal
action in state courts to establish and enforce fair share housing and
land use programs at the state and local levels. As a result of that
policy, an APA committee has carefully studied individual controversies raising fair share issues and has entered three significant cases since
1986.2
APA believes that Britton v. Chester is potentially a "landmark"
case. Building on existing New Hampshire law, there is a clear opportunity for the court to take the next step and mandate a fair share
approach that will permit low- and moderate-income persons to live in
communities from which they are now unfairly and unconstitutionally
excluded. Other states which have acted, with the exception of New
Jersey, have chosen formulations which have proven ineffective to deal
with this deeply rooted problem. Drawing on its national perspective,
APA seeks to assist the court in rethinking the proper nature of a remedy for exclusionary zoning, a remedy that, with appropriate constitutional guidance, can be implemented by the New Hampshire legislature
and serve as a model for the many other states with similar problems.
II. THE ORIGINS OF EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
A.

Chester'sLand Use PatternMust Be Evaluated in the Context of
National Demographic Trends

Chester is situated at the northern edge of a continuous urban region
sometimes called "Megalopolis" or the "Bos-Wash Corridor," which
extends 500 miles from southern New Hampshire through the Virginia
suburbs of Washington, D.C. While the population of the United
States as a whole has been growing rapidly since 1945, growth in the
Northeast has been concentrated in a few areas - notably the New
SHAFOR, A REGIONAL HOUSING PLAN: THE MIAMI VALLEY REGIONAL PLANNING

COMMISSION EXPERIENCE (Washington: AIP, Apr. 1971), appeal dismissed and cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975)). Other more recent publications include: AFFORDABLE
SINGLE-FAMILY HOUSING: A REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENT STANDARDS (Planning Advisory Service Report No. 385, 1984); CHANGING DEVELOPMENT STANDARDS FOR
AFFORDABLE HOUSING (Planning Advisory Service Report No. 371, 1982); INCLUSIONARY ZONING MOVES DOWNTowN (D. Merriam, D. Brower & P. Tegeler eds. 1985).

2. The American Planning Association has been involved as an amicus curiae at the
appellate level in three cases involving exclusionary zoning: Bonan v. City of Boston,
398 Mass. 315, 496 N.E.2d 640 (1986); Asian Americans for Equality v. Koch, 128
A.D.2d 99 (1st Dept. 1987), 514 N.Y.S.2d 939, aff'd, 72 N.Y.2d 121, 531 N.Y.S.2d 782,
527 N.E.2d 265 (1988); Suffolk Housing Serv. v. Town of Brookhaven, 70 N.Y.2d 122,
517 N.Y.S.2d 924, 511 N.E.2d 67 (1987).
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York metropolitan area's western edge (the suburban fringe of New
Jersey) and the Boston metropolitan area's northern fringe. This latter
area includes most of southeastern New Hampshire, particularly Hillsborough and Rockingham Counties. In 1980, Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (MSAs) comprised less than one-sixth of the total land area of
the United States but contained three-fourths of the American people.
Moreover, the land area occupied by these urbanized areas increased
by an extremely rapid forty percent during the 1970s, continuously expanding to encompass communities on the periphery of urban development.3 Accordingly, most of the growth has been in suburban, rather
than in urban or rural areas. This growth pattern holds true for housing as well as employment.
With rapid population growth has come an expansion of land use
controls. In general, the land planning process has contributed substantially to maintaining a livable environment. There is no doubt,
however, that an indirect, but not always unintended, effect of suburban land use controls has been to increase housing development costs,
thereby limiting suburban migration mostly to upper- and upper middle-income people. The result, for disfavored economic and racial
groups, has been loss of access to decent housing, to the better new jobs
in the suburbs, and to the vastly superior educational facilities that
train the middle class. This distortion of the spatial distribution of
population by income groups is in sharp contrast to the traditional
New England pattern of settlement, where most towns have included a
broad range of4 income groups and, therefore, a more democratic pattern of living.
Chester is at the heart of the southeastern New Hampshire growth
area. Since 1960, the Manchester MSA has grown into western Rockingham County to include Derry, the town immediately to the south of
Chester. The Towns of. Hamstead, Kingston, and Windham - all
3. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION, U.S. SUMMARY, TABLE 35 (1973); U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, 1980 CENSUS OF THE POPULATION, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION,

U.S. SUMMARY, TABLES I & 30 (1983). For a discussion of the enormous growth in the
metropolitan areas of the United States since the end of World War II, particularly the
Northeast corridor, see M. CLAWSON, SUBURBAN LAND CONVERSION IN THE UNITED
STATES 191-223 (1971). Stimulated by the completion of the interstate highway system,
that growth has not only shifted residences, but also businesses-manufacturing, office,
distribution, and retail-to suburban areas.
4. See generally Williams, PlanningLaw and Democratic Living, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBS. 317 (1955).
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within a few miles of Chester - have become part of the LawrenceHaverhill MSA. The Nashua and Lowell MSAs have both expanded
to include towns south and west of Chester. The recently designated
Portsmouth-Dover-Rochester MSA encompasses several Rockingham
County towns to the east and north of Chester.5
According to responses to a 1984 questionnaire administered by the
town's Planning Board, Chester's residents overwhelmingly prefer to
discourage growth and maintain a rural atmosphere.6 The strategy for
doing so, as in other exclusionary communities, is to emphasize a land
use plan based on large houses built on large lots. In reality, however,
Chester is integrated into a metropolitan-centered regional economy.
Contradicting the town's rural self-image, only 3.8% of Chester's employed population actually worked in farming, forestry, and fishing as
of 1980. Instead, 25.7% worked in managerial or professional positions, 25.1% in sales and administration, and the remaining 45.4% in
services, manufacturing and other nonfarm jobs.7
Further demonstrating the town's integration into the regional economy, only 15.3% of Chester's employed residents worked in the town,
while the remaining 84.7% commuted to jobs elsewhere in the region.
According to the 1980 Census, 30.9% held jobs in other Rockingham
County communities, 31.8% in other New Hampshire counties, and
22.0% outside the state.8 This pattern of metropolitan growth from
Boston northward into southern New Hampshire bears a strong parallel to the extension of the New York area into northeastern New Jersey
and of the Philadelphia/Camden area into southwestern New Jersey.9
5. See infra app. A (map illustrating changes).
6. Master Plan for Town of Chester, N.H., app. I, questions 1-4 (May 1986) [hereinafter Master Plan].
7. Id. at 76. Not only are few people in Chester engaged in farming, the town's
landscape is not, in reality, agricultural. Only 5.2% of Chester's land area is actively
used for agriculture. Another 10.2% of the land is devoted to housing, commercial,
recreational, transportation and other urban uses, while approximately 24.5% comprises environmentally sensitive wetlands, areas of steep slopes and special flood hazard
areas. That leaves approximately 60% of the town, or 10,000 acres, which is neither
urban, agricultural, nor environmentally sensitive. Id. at 8-9, 14, 18-23. This land
could be developed for a variety of activities, including low- and moderate-income housing, if the impediments were removed from Chester's zoning ordinance.
8. Id. at 75.
9. For a comparison with housing regions in New Jersey and the application of
those regions to the Mount Laurel decisions, see R. BURCHELL, P. BEATON & D. LisTOKIN, MT. LAUREL II: CHALLENGE AND DELIVERY OF Low-CosT HOUSING 33-73

(1983).
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As the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized in Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount LaurelI),1° it is
these communities "in the path of inevitable future residential, commercial and industrial demand and growth" that are most tempted to
use exclusionary land use practices.1 1
The towns of western Rockingham County are, like Chester, surrounded on all sides by expanding MSAs. Unlike Chester, these towns
experienced rapid population growth. Between 1980 and 1988, Census
Bureau estimates reveal that five of the six towns contiguous to
Chester-Auburn, Candia, Derry, Freemont, and Raymond-increased by 40% to 47%. Sandown, the sixth town, grew by an estimated 77.4%. In contrast to its neighbors, Chester's population
growth rate sharply declined from its 45.2% during the 1970s to only
27.1% between 1980 and 1988.12 Chester's lower rate of growth can
only be explained by regulatory restrictions on otherwise "inevitable"
population increases.
B.

Chester's Zoning Is Exclusionary

Legal commentators have defined exclusionary zoning as land use
regulation which raises the price of residential access to a particular
area and thereby denies that access to members of low-income
groups. 3 Communities that employ exclusionary zoning do so to preserve themselves as enclaves of one social or economic class. The use
of land use controls to segregate or exclude large groups of low- and
moderate-income persons from decent housing has been well documented. 4 The communities that have employed exclusionary zoning
tend to be those on the ex-urban or suburban fringe of metropolitan
10. 67 N.J. 151, 160, 336 A.2d 713, 717 (1975) (Mount Laurel!).
11. The Chester Master Plan recognizes that the town is currently a "bedroom
community" in southern New Hampshire and that "light, non-polluting industry and
commercial enterprises" are to be encouraged. Master Plan, supra note 6, at 77.
12. See infra app. B.
13. Sager, Tight Little Islands. Exclusionary Zoning, EqualProtection and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1969). See also Annotation, Exclusionary Zoning, 48
A.L.R. 3D 1210, 1212 (1973).
14. See, e.g., M. DANIELSON, THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION (1976); L. RUBINOWITZ, LOW-INCOME HOUSING: SUBURBAN STRATEGIES (1974); Branfman, Cohen

& Trubeck, Measuring the Invisible Wall: Land Use Controls and the Residential Patterns of the Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 483 (1973); Williams & Norman, Exclusionary Land
Use Controls: The Case of North-EasternNew Jersey, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 475 (1971).
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15

areas.
Exclusionary zoning is particularly pernicious because lower income
individuals are unable to find affordable housing near suburban places
of work, necessitating lengthy commuting trips. As these areas typically have limited, if any, mass transit, the journey to work must be by
automobile,1 6creating additional economic hardship for lower income
individuals.

Williams and Norman, in their analysis of four New Jersey counties
comprising the outer ring around the New York City metropolitan
area's western edge, described six major exclusionary devices that,
apart from market considerations, impose extraordinary additional
costs for new housing. 7 These devices, all six of which Chester uses in
varying degrees to erect a series of barriers to developers or potential
residents of affordable housing, are: (1) Excluding multiple-family
dwellings totally or making them subject to a more onerous approval
process; (2) restrictions on the number of bedrooms to discourage lowincome families; (3) prohibiting or severely limiting inexpensive factory-built (mobile) homes; (4) minimum lot size requirements much
larger than justified by any legitimate health or safety concerns;
(5) large lot width requirements, which drive up site development
costs; and (6) large minimum building size requirements, which in effect mandate expensive buildings where cheaper ones could provide
safe, decent housing for poor families.I Appendix C sets forth in tabular form a more detailed analysis of Chester's ordinance according to
the Williams and Norman criteria. 9 Suffice it to reiterate here that the
land use pattern encouraged by Chester's ordinance is completely at
odds with the long tradition in New England of compact town centers
15. M. DANIELSON, supra note 14, at 27-49.
16. See generally R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: LAND
USE REGULATION AND HOUSING IN THE 1970s 114-15 (1973).
17. Williams & Norman, supra note 14, at 481, 484.
18. Id. The Connecticut Supreme Court has recently struck down zoning code pro.
visions which established minimum building size requirements irrespective of the dwelling's number of occupants since they do not serve any legitimate zoning objective.
Builders Serv. Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 208 Conn. 267, 545 A.2d 530
(1988). See also Home Builders League of South Jersey, Inc. v. Berlin Township, 81
N.J. 127, 405 A.2d 381 (1979).

19. For a discussion of the consequences of these six exclusionary devices on housing prices, see L. SAGALYN & G. STERNLIEB, ZONING AND HOUSING COSTS: THE IMPACT OF LAND-USE CONTROLS ON HOUSING PRICE 16-19, 48-58 (1973); S. SEIDEL,
HOUSING COSTS AND GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS:
TORY MAZE 119-94 (1978).

CONFRONTING THE REGULA-
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in which all classes and income groups could find a place to live and
work.
C. There Is a Well- Understood PoliticalDynamic that Encourages
Municipalities Such as Chester to Practice Exclusionary
Zoning
Because of the complex and highly discretionary nature of most land
planning decisions, it is obviously attractive to seek political solutions
to the problem of exclusionary zoning. The APA submits that effective
political solutions are obtainable, but not without an initial application
of the strong hand of the judiciary. To see why this is so, the political
dynamics of exclusionary zoning must be appreciated.
Exclusionary practices on the periphery of urban development stem
from two principal political motivations: fear of outsiders or "undesirables," and the search for tax ratables.
1. Fear of Outsiders/Exclusion of "Undesirables"
Exclusionary zoning is often motivated by fear and prejudice against
outsiders, particularly those of other social, economic, and racial
groups. These fears may often take the form that new immigrants, particularly if they are low-income, will have different lifestyles
and not
20
"fit in," thus threatening the status of existing residents.
Chester's residents overwhelmingly oppose construction which
would serve to increase the diversity of the town's housing stock. According to the Planning Board's survey, 74% oppose permitting multifamily dwellings which could accommodate more than two families;
70.2% oppose permitting planned unit developments which could include a mix of single-family, multi-family and commercial uses; 66.5%
oppose permitting dwellings to be clustered close together even if the
overall density within the project
remained consistent with the town's
21
two acre minimum lot size.

In the landmark opinion, Beck v. Town of Raymond, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court recognized that towns may not employ
zoning devices "simply to exclude outsiders ....especially outsiders of
any disadvantaged social or economic group. ' 22 However, the contin20.

See C. PERIN, EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE: SOCIAL ORDER AND LAND USE IN

AMERICA 163-209 (1977).
21. Master Plan, supra note 6.
22. 118 N.H. 793, 801, 394 A.2d 847, 852 (1978) (citing Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J.
151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975)).
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ued existence of exclusionary practices in New Hampshire, such as
seen in the Chester ordinance, demonstrates that the social and political impetus to be exclusionary has overpowered the existing legal remedies. This case offers an opportunity to redress the imbalance.
2. Low-cost Housing as a Bad Ratable
Chester's residents oppose population growth in part because they
fear that increased demand for services and infrastructure would result
in higher taxes for them.2" A town like Chester derives most of its
revenue from property taxes. Opposition to constructing affordable
housing can be especially vehement because some residents believe that
the owners of housing with low assessed values may require the outlay
of more expenditures for services than they contribute to the tax base.
Consequently, towns often impose limitations on the number of bedrooms in apartments to insure that families with children, who will
presumably increase educational costs, will find it difficult to reside in
the school district.
This court disapproved "fiscal zoning" in the Beck decision.2 4 However, given New Hampshire's heavy reliance on the property tax to
fund locally-provided services, as is also true in many other states, it is
unrealistic to anticipate that fiscal zoning will fade from the municipal
consciousness unless strong steps are taken to prohibit it.
3. Overuse of the Environmental Defense
The desire to preserve the environment is often cited as a reason for
imposing severe restrictions on land development. Chester's Master
Plan, for instance, carefully documents environmentally sensitive areas, including flood hazards, wetlands, and steep slopes, where the
town has a legitimate interest in restricting development. But the extensive restrictions imposed on the development of land in Chester are
not reasonably justified by the limited acreage which may require careful environmental management, as depicted in the town's plan. Ecological concerns may mask exclusionary motives:
[A] locality's justifications often relate to the supposedly inevitable
consequences of middle-and high-density development. . . . In
most cases, these negative impacts can be reduced significantly or
avoided entirely by sensitive site selection and design. Unwilling23. Master Plan, supra note 6.
24. Beck, 118 N.J. at 801, 394 A.2d at 851.
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ness on the part of a community to even attempt this reconciliation indicates that other motives are probably operating.2 5
Rather than an "environmental defense," which sets environmental
protection against affordable housing and the environment should be
seen as complementary aspects of an overall goal of serving the public
interest. A well thought out affordable housing policy can actually enhance environmental protection strategies, by insuring that needed
housing is built in the right place (near existing centers of population)
and at high enough densities to use land efficiently (leaving unbuilt
land in its natural state). Sprawl produces neither affordable housing
nor environmental protection.
D.

The Problem of Exclusionary Zoning is the Direct Result of
State Action Which Delegates State Constitutional
Authority to Zone Without Placing Controls on
the Substantive Exercise of the
Delegated Powers

The statutory basis for planning and zoning in the United States derives from the Standard Planning and Zoning Enabling Acts, drafted
by an advisory committee of the United States Department of Commerce in the 1920s under then Secretary Herbert Hoover. The Standard Acts were adopted by virtually all the states, including New
Hampshire.26 Despite many amendments, the Standard Acts still provide the framework for planning and land use regulation throughout
most of the nation.
The Standard Acts treated land use as a local problem and an urban
problem with no consequences that extended beyond the city boundary. Absent the state's subsequent articulation of a state interest in the
25. L. RUBINowrrz, supra note 14, at 30. See also Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 279-80, 456 A.2d 390, 452 (1983)
(Mount Laurel II) (environmental concerns to be taken into account in locating lowand moderate-income housing).
26. New Hampshire adopted the Standard Acts early: the Zoning Enabling Act in
1925 and the Planning/Subdivision Enabling Act in 1935. Although zoning ordinances
were quickly adopted by some of the major cities (Manchester and Portsmouth in 1927;
Concord and Nashua in 1930), most of the smaller municipalities did not utilize these
land use controls until after 1960. Of New Hampshire's 234 municipalities, 30 municipalities had adopted zoning by 1950, 111 had done so by 1960, and 208 had done so by
1990. NEW HAMPSHIRE OFFICE OF STATE PLANNING, SUMMARY OF PLANNING AcTIVITIES (rev. May 21, 1990). By 1970, however, all but two of the most northerly
municipalities in the Southern New Hampshire Planning Region had adopted zoning
ordinances and subdivision regulations. Id.
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legislation, the Standard Acts delegated virtually total control of land
use to the local level, "historically the city level where the problems
which called zoning into being first arose."2 7
The Standard Acts were process oriented, concentrating on the
mechanics of making decisions rather than the substantive content of
those decisions.2 8 Communities were to exercise their land use powers
for the broad purposes of "health, safety, morals or general welfare of
the community," 29 with no recognition of extra-jurisdictional impact
- either regional or statewide. Armed with this ambiguous authority,
the "general welfare" objective to be achieved by the enactment of land
use regulations became purely local and insular. Courts recognized
this flaw and the potential for exclusionary mischief in some of the
earliest zoning cases, even though they generally upheld the zoning restrictions. For instance, in Brett v. Building Commissioner of Brookline,3 ° the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found Brookline's
single family zoning to be valid. The court, however, carefully noted:
[T]here is nothing on the face of this by-law to indicate that it will
not operate indifferently for the general benefit. It is a matter of
common knowledge that there are in numerous districts plans for
real estate developments involving modest single-family dwellings
within the reach as to price of the thrifty and economical of moderate wage earning capacity. 3'
Under the modern conditions of burgeoning urbanized populations
filling ever-expanding metropolitan regions tied together by high speed
transportation and communications networks, the simplistic localism
of the Standard Acts is clearly inadequate as a delegation of land use
powers. Ideally, the legislature should update the delegation framework through regionally-oriented statutory changes, as this court
urged in the Beck case.3 2 If this were done, it would be a simple and
27. F. BOSSELMAN & D.

CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CON-

TROL 3 (1972). Cf. A. BET'MAN, Brief in Euclid v. Ambler, City and Regional Planning Papers, 174-83 (1946); S. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN (1969) (discussion of the early
development of zoning).

28.
29.

See D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 76 (2d ed. 1988).
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD ZONING ENABLING ACT § 1 (1926).

Cf. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 674:16, :17(c) (1986).

30. 250 Mass. 73, 145 N.E. 269 (1924).
31. Id. at 79, 145 N.E. 269. See also Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926);
Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 565-66, 42 N.E.2d 516, 519 (1942) (the
"general interests of the public at large" includes opportunity for families to purchase

"low cost houses").
32. See Beck v. Town of Raymond, 118 N.H. 793, 394 A.2d 847 (1978). See gener-
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appropriate matter for the judiciary to maintain the traditional deference accorded governmental actions, because the decision-making
would occur at a level where all those affected would have an opportunity to participate and influence those actions. 33
With very limited exceptions, however,3 4 the legislature has chosen
to keep substantive decision-making at the local level. Moreover, it is
highly unlikely, given the nature of the state legislative process, that
this local focus will be altered. Consequently, the lower income person's constitutional right of fair access to communities such as Chester
will lie fallow until this court acts. By acting carefully but forcefully,
this court can give the legislature a constitutional choice: maintain full
local control of land use, but with constitutionally mandated, judicially
enforced substantive protections against local parochialism, or, as the
New Jersey legislature chose to do after the second Mount Laurel decision, restructure the system to provide for state and regional inputs
that will justify judicial deference.
ally Williams, PlanningLaw in the 1980's: What Do We Know About It?, 7 VT. L. REV.
205 (1982).
33. Cf, N.H. CONST., pt. I, art. 12: "Nor are the inhabitants of this state controllable by any other laws than those to which they, or their representative body, have given
their consent." Id. On the question of matching decision-making levels with those affected by the decisions, see generally Payne, Delegation Doctrinein the Reform of Local
Government Law: The Case of Exclusionary Zoning, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 803 (1976).
34. New Hampshire's planning and land use statutes, which underwent extensive
revision in 1983, indicate that a town's master plan may include a "housing section
which analyzes existing housing resources and addresses current and future housing
needs of residents of all levels of income of the municipality and the region in which it is
located." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:2:111 (1986 & Supp. 1990). Additionally, the
statutes authorize a series of "innovative land use controls" which permit incentives or
benefits to landowners to develop housing for low- and moderate-income housing. Id.
§ 674:21. But the statutes do not mandate any clear connection between the analysis of
housing needs, on the one hand, and the preparation of regulations to assure the availability of sufficiently zoned land for housing low- and moderate-income persons. See id.
§ 674:18 (statement of objectives and land use section of master plan only requirements
for adoption of zoning ordinance); cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-62(a) (West 1986 &
Supp. 1990) (to zone, master plan must include housing element). The real issue, however, is not whether New Hampshire communities may facilitate lower income housing,
but whether they must. The state statutes are gentle exhortations which, in context, are
little more than window dressing.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:17-I(c) (1986) expands the "community welfare" purposes of the zoning code to include "promot[ing] health and the general welfare," arguably a broader set of purposes that could include both regional and statewide
concerns. Id. In context, however, this language can just as readily be limited to local
general welfare.
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E. State Legislative Mechanisms Are Inadequate to Solve the
Problem of Exclusionary Zoning
The inability of legislatures to deal with the exclusionary zoning
problem should not be found surprising. With the rapid expansion of
suburban populations3 5 and "the reapportionment revolution which
has insured equitable representation of suburbanites in every state capital,''36 the political attitudes which result in exclusionary zoning at the
local level37 also dominate the state legislatures.
Professor Danielson's study of the politics of exclusionary zoning
remains as valid today as when it was written immediately after the
Mount Laurel I decision.38 Danielson notes that it is hard to build
political coalitions in support of affordable housing, particularly by
those who most need it. The poor who need affordable housing in suburban areas often lack political power. 39 In addition, other groups home builders, real estate brokers, business groups, particularly large
suburban employers - who might advocate for affordable housing at
the national or state level are politically constrained in asserting themselves at the local level by their roles in maintaining effective relations
with local governments.' These groups cannot rock the boat. Innercity politicians, in addition to being outnumbered by their suburban
counterparts, are often unenthusiastic about encouraging dispersal of
their own political base to distant suburban communities.4
Danielson also provides evidence of these political theories in practice. Specifically, Danielson cited affordable housing initiatives by
35. See supra Point II(A).
36. M. DANIELSON, supra note 14, at 281.
37. See supra Point II(C).
38. See also P. COOPER, HARD JUDICIAL CHOICES 30-31, 32, 42-44 (1988).
39. As Danielson correctly observed,
[The poor] commonly lack influence in most suburban political arenas. The spatial
differentiation of the suburban population leaves many jurisdictions with few
lower-income residents. In the communities where poor suburbanites live, those
with modest incomes typically participate less than the more affluent. They tend to
be poorly informed, to fail to perceive their stake in local public policies, and to
lack the time, resources, skills, and organizational capabilities to promote and defend their interests effectively. Further limiting the influence of lower-income
groups is the small scale of most suburbs, which makes it difficult for minority
interests to overcome their political weaknesses by the strength of numbers, as is
possible in larger jurisdictions.
M. DANIELSON, supra note 14, at 124.
40. Id. at 131-48.
41. Id. at 149-58.
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state-level politicians in Wisconsin, Illinois, and Connecticut, with detailed attention to pre-Mount Laurel efforts in New Jersey and the Urban Development Corporation debacle in New York. In each instance,
Danielson recorded a history of dismal failures, with the proponents of
building low-income housing in the suburbs almost always meeting defeat because of local opposition expressed through their state
legislatures.4 2
Danielson notes two principal "aberrations" of this pattern, in Massachusetts and in Dayton, Ohio, where fair housing programs were
adopted. He attributes success in each case, however, to unique situations which, while not wholly incapable of repetition, are obviously exceptions to the general pattern, and which are not immediately
applicable in New Hampshire.4 3 The constitutional rights of New
Hampshire's poor citizens cannot be deferred on such a slender chance
of success in the political arena.
III.

JUDICIAL INTERVENTION TO ERADICATE EXCLUSIONARY
ZONING IS APPROPRIATE IF IT IS CAREFULLY CRAFTED
TO INSURE REMEDIAL ACTION BY THE STATE
LEGISLATURE

A.

The New Hampshire Legislature and Courts Have Begun to
Recognize the Seriousness of the Problem

The 1970s saw an increased use of local planning and zoning ordinances for exclusionary purposes, and a resulting increase in such techniques as the use of larger lot sizes and other density limitations,"
limitations on mobile homes,4 5 and limitations on the numbers and locations of multi-family dwellings. Additionally, the 1970s saw the beginnings of growth limiting ordinances controlling the number of
42. Id. at 289-322.
43. Danielson attributes success to the relatively modest scope of each proposal. In
Massachusetts, he also found key support from white Boston legislators who were deter-

mined to retaliate against the suburbs for their support of school desegregation legislation that primarily affected Boston. Id. at 300-06. In Dayton, he found an unusually
homogeneous small urbanized region with unusually effective political leadership on the
housing issue. Id. at 250-62.
44. See Steel Hill Dev. Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 338 F. Supp. 301 (D.N.H.),
aff'd, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972); Beck v. Town of Raymond, 118 N.H. 793, 394 A.2d
847 (1978); Town of Durham v. White Enters., Inc., 115 N.H. 645, 348 A.2d 706
(1975).

45. See Cloutier v. Epping Sewer & Water Comm'n, 116 N.H. 276, 360 A.2d 892
(1976); Village House, Inc. v. Town of Loudon, 114 N.H. 76, 314 A.2d 635 (1974).
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building permits issued per year.46 Finally, the 1970s witnessed the
imposition of environmental protection ordinances and regulations
which further decreased density by, for example, increasing setbacks
from wetlands and limiting building on aquifer recharge areas.
The legislature tried to counter these exclusionary trends with three
basic measures. First, the legislature placed successively more stringent limitations on a municipality's ability to zone out manufactured
housing.4 7 Second, it has put limitations on the use of planning and
zoning, especially growth timing ordinances, by legislating that such
ordinances must be a part of, and a direct result of, a comprehensive
planning process and not arbitrary.4 8 Third, it has enunciated policies
that mitigate the discrimination against low-income people, resulting
from planning and zoning misuse.4 9 As previously noted, the legislature has also given its explicit approval to "innovative land use con-

trols," one of which is "inclusionary zoning.""
46. See Stoney-Brook Dev. Corp. v. Town of Fremont, 124 N.H. 583, 474 A.2d 561
(1984); Conway v. Town of Stratham, 120 N.H. 257, 414 A.2d 539 (1980); Beck v.
Town of Raymond, 118 N.H. 793, 394 A.2d 847 (1978).
47. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:118-:119 (1981), repealedand readopted, 1983
with revisions as Id. § 674:31-:32 (1986) and amended again in 1985.
48. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. LXIV, Planningand Zoning, Note re "History"
(conforming master plan and zoning ordinances within two years); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 674:18 (1986) (requiring adoption of statement of objectives and land use section of master plan before adopting zoning ordinance); Id. § 674:22 (growth management control "may be adopted only after preparation and adoption by a planning board
of a master plan and capital and improvement program and shall be based on a growth
management process intended to access and balance community development needs and
consider regional development needs").
49. In particular, see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 204-C (1989):
It is hereby declared that ... there continues to exist within the state a serious
shortage of safe and sanitary dwelling accommodations at rents which elderly and
low income persons can afford and that such persons are forced to occupy substandard dwelling accommodations; that the result and conditions of insecurity, overcrowding, use of unsound and unsanitary buildings and dislocation of family life
are injurious to health and safety and detrimental to morale and constitute a dangerous threat to the well-being of the entire state ....
Id. See also the Declaration of Purpose in Chapter 406 of the Laws of 1981 and the
"Findings and Statement of Intent" of Chapter 240 of the Laws of 1988.
50. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:21(k) (1986 & Supp. 1990). It should also be
noted that, pursuant to state planning procedures, the Southern New Hampshire Planning Commission (SNHPC) prepared the Housing Element of the Land Use Plan 2010
for the Southern New Hampshire Planning Commission Region in June 1988. Table 24
of that Housing Element identified a total low- and moderate-income housing need for
the region of 8322 units as of the 1980 Census. Chester's adjusted fair share allocation
of low- and moderate-income housing under the SNHPC plan was 90 units. Under
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The New Hampshire Supreme Court has, likewise, reviewed the use
of municipal planning and zoning to restrict growth. Beginning in
1978, the court began to receive challenges to local land use regulations
alleging an exclusionary result. In Beck v. Town of Raymond,51 the
court acknowledged the existence of municipal power to control the
timing of growth (this predated N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 674:22 (1986))
but warned such controls could not be adopted lightly.52 The court
stated that growth controls must be accompanied by good faith efforts
to increase the capacity of municipal services,53 and it emphasized that
such measures may not be used simply to exclude outsiders of any disadvantaged social or economic group.5 4 Likewise, in Stoney-Brook Development Corp. v. Town of Freemont, the court stated that growth
controls are intended to "regulate and control the timing of development, . . not the prevention of development."" These cases, which
are based squarely on New Hampshire law but which recognize and
cite with approval the analogous decision of the New Jersey Supreme
Court in the first Mount Laurel case, establish the basis for a nonexclusionary obligation on the part of New Hampshire
municipalities.56
Two later decisions of this court implicitly expand the non-exclusionary premise of Beck by mandating the inclusion of "undesirables"
Chester's Master Plan, which assumed the region to be Rockingham County, Chester
had a "fair share" allocation of 67 low- and moderate-income households. Master Plan,
supra note 6, at 49.
51. 118 N.H. 793, 394 A.2d 847 (1978).
52. Specifically, the court stated:
Growth controls must, however, be reasonable and nondiscriminatory.... Good
faith efforts to increase the capacity of municipal services should accompany
growth controls. They must not be parochial; that is, controls must not be imposed
simply to exclude outsiders, especially outsiders of any disadvantaged social or economic group.
Id. at 800-01, 394 A.2d at 852 (citations omitted).
53. Id.
54. Id. The court added:
Towns may not refuse to confront the future by building a moat around themselves
and pulling up the drawbridge. They must develop plans to insure that municipal
services, which normal growth will require, will be provided for in an orderly and
rational manner. Any limitations on the expansion must not unreasonably restrict
normal growth.
Id. at 801, 394 A.2d at 852.
55. 124 N.H. 583, 589, 474 A.2d 561, 564 (1984) (citing N.H. REV.STAT. ANN.
§ 31:62-a (Supp. 1983)).
56.

See Beck v. Town of Raymond, 118 N.H. 793, 801, 394 A.2d 847, 851 (1978).
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in a single-family residential zone on the basis of a broad reading of
legislative policy. In Region 10 Client Management, Inc. v. Town of
Hampstead,5 7 a half-way house for retarded persons was deemed a permitted use which overrode local "single-family" zoning, because it was
state "sponsored," even though not state owned or operated. The
court found that the statutory scheme embodied a state policy that local zoning ordinances may not circumvent.5" As indicated above,
there is ample evidence in the New Hampshire Revised Statutes that
the legislature also recognizes the parochial tendency of municipalities
with respect to low-income housing, analogous to the policies recognized in Region 10.
Most recently, in Soares v. Town of Atkinson,59 the New Hampshire
court was called upon to consider the cumulative effect of large lot
sizes, restrictions on mobile homes and multi-family dwellings, growth
timing ordinances, and environmental protection provisions on the affordability of housing, and, in turn, upon the ability of people of lowand moderate-incomes to live in that housing. The court was also, for
the first time, called upon to decide the appropriateness of the
"builder's remedy."
In Soares, the lower court voided the ordinance on the basis of Beck
and the Mount Laurel doctrine. While the municipality's appeal was
pending, Atkinson revised the challenged ordinance, and the supreme
court remanded the matter to the lower court to examine the case in
light of the new ordinance. Significantly, both this court and the
Master saw the issue on remand to be whether the revised ordinance
satisfied the constitutional standard; both ultimately concluded that it
did. 6° The Chester case now before the court affords an appropriate
opportunity to make explicit what is implicit in the Soares case: that
the exclusionary effects of local land use controls violate the
57. 120 N.H. 885, 424 A.2d 207 (1980).
58. Id. at 888, 424 A.2d at 209. Accord Northern N.H. Mental Health Hous., Inc.
v. Town of Conway, 121 N.H. 811,435 A.2d 131 (1981) (half-way house for mentally ill
persons).

59. 128 N.H. 350, 512 A.2d 436 (1986), appeal after remand, 129 N.H. 313, 529
A.2d 867 (1987).
60. In the second Soares appeal, the supreme court also ruled on subsidiary issues,
which included the builder's remedy, attorney's fees and costs, and damages. The court
upheld the Master's finding that the builder's remedy was inappropriate under the specific circumstances and that, given the particular facts of the case, neither attorney's
fees, costs, nor damages, were appropriately awarded. The opinion does not indicate
that these remedies could never be considered appropriate.
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1

In the progression from Beck to Soares, the courts have considered
increasingly stringent remedies for exclusionary practices. The APA
submits that this progression to a strong remedy is necessary if constitutional rights to non-exclusionary zoning are to be vindicated, but will
suggest in Point IV some important modifications of the Master's approach. By way of summary, however, we emphasize that if this court
takes the next logical step, as requested in the Chester case, it will be
acting squarely within its own precedents and the articulated policies
of the State of New Hampshire.
B.

The New Hampshire Developments are Part of a Nationwide
Trend, Especially Experienced in States Having Rapid
Population Growth
The Chester litigation also comes within the context of a rapidly
evolving concern about exclusionary land use controls in other states.
1. New Jersey
In the Mount Laurel doctrine, New Jersey has taken one possible
next step, that of mandating systematic, affirmative measures to encourage production of low- and moderate-income housing. The most
important lesson of the New Jersey experience, however, is that without a firm judicial hand, articulation of a constitutional obligation will
be little more than empty rhetoric. The first Mount Laurel opinion, in
1975, concluded with an optimistic statement by the court that "[t]he
municipality should first have full opportunity to itself act without judicial supervision. We trust it will do so in the spirit we have suggested." 62 Mount Laurel Township, however, did not comply. 63 Nor

did any significant number of other municipalities, nor did the state. 64
With its dramatically expanded remedies, Mount Laurel 11 success61.

Despite the outcome of the Soares case, the APA notes that ordinance revisions

can be used by recalcitrant municipalities to delay compliance with their constitutional
obligation. Because of such abuses, the New Jersey Supreme Court eventually decided
that it would not remand to consider post-trial revisions to a challenged ordinance and
that it would not hear a municipality's appeal until it had been adjudged in full compliance by the trial judge. See Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. 158, 290, 456 A.2d 390, 458
(1983).

62.
63.

64.

67 N.J. 151, 192, 336 A.2d 713, 734 (1975).
Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 198-99, 456 A.2d at 410.
Id. See also Payne, Housing Rights and Remedies: A "Legislative History" of

Mount Laurel H, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 889 (1984).
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fully put "steel" into the Mount Laurel doctrine. 6' Even under the
threat of these sanctions, however, most municipalities waited to be
sued rather than coming into compliance voluntarily. It was fierce opposition to this volume of litigation which eventually convinced a reluctant legislature and governor that a "political" solution, the New
Jersey Fair Housing Act of 1985,66 was a preferable solution. In the
so-called Mount Laurel III decision, Hills Development Co. v. Township of Bernards,67 the New Jersey Supreme Court swept aside objections to some of the political compromises contained in the Act and
announced that it would give the new administrative mechanisms time
68
to mature before entertaining any further Mount Laurel challenges.
The New Jersey experience confirms Professor Danielson's earlier
analysis, summarized in Point II, of the necessity for judicial intervention if the exclusionary zoning problem is to be solved. A recent study
found that the Mount Laurel approach worked well, providing more
than 22,000 units of affordable housing either built or planned between
1983 and 1988.69 Other states, those that have attempted to address
affordable housing issues without an active judicial role, provide further examples of both the evolving national trend towards recognition
of the exclusionary zoning problem and the crucial role of an enforceable judicial interpretation of the state constitution.
65. Mount LaurelII, 92 N.J. at 200, 456 A.2d at 410.
66. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-301 to 329 (West 1986)
67. 103 N.J. 1, 510 A.2d 621 (1986).
68. In the words of one account of the New Jersey experience:
The lesson of New Jersey is that the legislature will not act without pressure from
the judiciary.... Criticism ofjudicial activism in exclusionary zoning cases arises
from a belief that since judges are ordinarily not elected, courts should defer to the
legislature. Yet such wisdom is most persuasive only in a vacuum; in New Jersey,
the state legislature was immobilized on the exclusionary zoning issue due to opposition by suburban lawmakers, who worked closely with the local officials elected in
their towns. The New Jersey State legislature thus avoided the problem of exclusionary zoning until the New Jersey Supreme Court's rulings forced it to act. The
court's action resulted in the forming of a political consensus which was required
for the legislation to pass.... The lesson in the New Jersey experience is the vital
role a court can play in publicizing important yet complex issues about which citizens might otherwise be ambivalent.
McDougall, From Litigation to Legislation in Exclusionary Zoning Law, in LAND USE
& ENVrL. L. REV. 203, 204-05, 239-41 (1988) (citations omitted). See M. DANIELSON,
supra note 14, at 289-300.
69. See Lamar, Mallach & Payne, Mount Laurel at Work: Affordable Housing in
New Jersey 1983-1988, 41 RUTGERS L. Rav. 1197 (1989); see also infra app. D for full
tabulation of study data.
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New York

In Berenson v. Town of New Castle,7" an early growth management
case, the New York Court of Appeals invalidated a town's refusal to
zone for multiple family dwellings. The court effectively adopted the
Mount Laurel I rationale of "regional general welfare" and suggested
two tests for evaluating restrictive zoning: first, whether the ordinance
provided a "balanced and well ordered plan," and second, whether
there was "consideration . . . given to regional needs and requirements."7 1 While adhering to the Berenson doctrine, the New York
court has had difficulty making it into an effective mechanism for meeting the needs of low- and moderate-income households.7 2
The most recent New York decision, Suffolk Housing Services v.
Town of Brookhaven,73 illustrates both the strengths and the weaknesses of that state's approach. While reiterating in stirring language
its regional approach and constitutional commitment to "breaking
down . . . barriers that frustrate the deep human yearnings of lowincome and minority groups for decent housing they can afford in decent surroundings,"'74 the court of appeals denied town-wide relief.
The court held that the plaintiffs must come forward with a specific
housing site and developer before relief can be granted.75 We submit
that it is unreasonable to expect general vindication of constitutional
70. 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
71. Id. at 110-11, 341 N.F.2d at 242-43, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681. The court continued:
[I]t must be recognized that zoning often has substantial impact beyond the boundaries of the municipality. Thus, the court, in examining the ordinance, should take
into consideration not only the general welfare of the residents of the zoning township, but should also consider the effect of the ordinance on neighboring
communities.
Id.
72. In the words of one knowledgeable commentator, the New York courts
have not only failed to clarify the doctrine... but have gradually restructured it in
such a way that today it appear to be in serious danger of disappearing entirely not through explicit re-evaluation or reversal, but through a process of judicial
erosion.
Mallach, The Tortured Reality of Suburban Exclusion: Zoning, Economics and the Future of the Berenson Doctrine, 4 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 37, 42 (1986). See also Rice,
Survey of New York Law: Zoning andLand Use, 37 SYRACUSE L. REv. 747, 755 (1986)
("the lack of low-income housing which has resulted from ... the Berenson standard of
review").
73. 70 N.Y.2d 122, 511 N.E.2d 67, 517 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1987).
74. Id. at 131, 511 N.E.2d at 71, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 927 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 528-29 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
75, Id.
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rights if the plaintiffs in each site-specific battle must endure the length,
complexity and expense that the New York court imposed on the
Brookhaven plaintiffs.
3. California
In Associated Homebuilders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of
Livermore,76 the California Supreme Court similarly embraced the
view that a municipality may not zone without regard to the regional
effect of its regulations. Although reaffirming deference to the legislative process such that a local land use regulation would be upheld if it
"reasonably relates to the public welfare," the court explained that its
analysis "should begin by asking whose welfare must the ordinance
serve." 77 The supreme court then remanded the case, instructing the
lower court to determine whether a municipality's regulation influenced the supply and distribution of housing beyond the municipality.
If so, "judicial inquiry must consider the welfare of that region."' 78 Citing Mount Laurel and several law reviews, the court concluded:
To hold ... that defendant city may zone the land within its bor-

der without any concern for [nonresidents] would indeed make a
fetish out of invisible municipal boundary lines and a mockery of
the principles of zoning.79
Unlike the ambiguous quasi-standing requirement of New York's
Suffolk Housing decision, the California courts have rejected the
Warth v. Seldin model and have held that standing to challenge exclusionary practices does not depend on a showing of "substantial
probability" that the alleged injury would not exist but for those practices. As the California Supreme Court recognized,
[a]pplying the Warth standard in California would have the effect
of putting the most restrictive zoning ordinances beyond judicial
76. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
77. Id. at 605, 557 P.2d at 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 55. The court explained:
In past cases... we have been content to assume that the ordinance need only

reasonably relate to the welfare of the enacting municipality and its residents. But
municipalities are not isolated islands remote from the needs and problems of the
area in which they are located; thus, an ordinance, superficially reasonable from
the limited viewpoint of the municipality, may be disclosed as unreasonable when
viewed from a larger perspective.
Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 608, 557 P.2d at 488, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 56 (citing Scott v. City of Indian
Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541, 548, 492 P.2d 1137, 1141, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745, 749 (1972)).
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review. The more restrictive the city's zoning becomes, the less
likely it will be that a builder will propose a housing project that
would satisfy the needs of the excluded group. Such an act by a
builder becomes an increasingly futile gesture."'
4. Pennsylvania
A line of early Pennsylvania cases preceded the Mount Laurel doctrine. The leading decision isAppeal of Girsh.81 In that case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held unconstitutional a total exclusion of
apartments from a relatively small, but largely built-up wealthy community outside Philadelphia."'
Later Pennsylvania cases quoted with approval the Mount Laurel
doctrine, including Willistown Township v. ChesterdaleFarms, Inc. ,83
and Surrick v. Zoning HearingBoard of Upper Providence Township.8 4
In Surrick, the Pennsylvania Court explicitly rejected the United States
Supreme Court's view in MetropolitanHousing Development Co. v. Village of Arlington Heights,"' that proof of discriminatory intent was
necessary in housing cases. The court emphasized that, at least in
Pennsylvania, evidence of exclusionary effect was more important. As
in New York, however, Pennsylvania's results have fallen short of its
expansive doctrinal language.8 6 This is because Pennsylvania has focused on requiring a diversity of building types rather than a diversity
of affordability levels. The plaintiff in Girsh, for instance, wanted to
build two nine-story luxury buildings.8 7 As Justice Hall aptly noted in
80. Stocks v. City of Irvine, 114 Cal. App. 3d 520, 533, 170 Cal. Rptr. 724, 731
(1981).
81. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
82. Id. at 242-43, 263 A.2d at 397-98. The decision contains ringing language about
the evils of exclusion:
Appellee here has simply made a decision that it is content with things as they are,
and that the expense or change in character that would result from people moving
in to find "a comfortable place to live" are for someone else to worry about. That
decision is unacceptable.... [lf Nether Providence is a logical place for development to take place, it should not be heard to say that it will not bear its rightful
part of the burden.
Id. at 244-45, 263 A.2d at 398-99.
83. 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466 (1975).
84. 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105 (1977).
85. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
86. See generally Note, The PennsylvaniaSupreme Court and the ExclusionaryZoning Dilemma, 29 VILL. L. REv. 477 (1984).
87. See 2 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 50.18 (rev. ed. 1987).
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Mount Laurel I, zoning should be for the living welfare of the people,
not for abstractions such as building types."s
5. Other States
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, California and Pennsylvania claim the leading decisions on the regional welfare approach
to local land use controls. Several other states have also recognized
and condemned exclusionary zoning, including Washington, Massachusetts and Michigan. 9 Several states, including New Hampshire,
have used legislative initiative to recognize and condemn exclusionary
zoning, but these tend to be either loosely worded or permissive. This
reflects the pressures on legislatures to stop short of effective
enforcement. 90
This recitation has included only incidental mention of federal law
92
because, apart from statute, 9 ' there is no federal right to shelter.
This places the responsibility squarely before the states and their individual constitutional systems, for shelter is amongst the most basic of
human needs and regulation of land uses to provide shelter is one of
the most basic functions of state law. In simpler times, simple forms of
regulation and simpler levels of judicial review sufficed. As the foregoing survey of legal developments demonstrates, however, states with
differing characteristics are increasingly alert to the problem of exclusionary zoning and have dealt with it with varying degrees of success.
At a minimum there can be no question that judicial action is
warranted.
88. Mount LaurelI, 67 N.J. 151, 188, 336 A.2d 713, 732 (1975).
89. See Sturges v. Town of Chilmark, 380 Mass. 246, 402 N.E.2d 1346 (1980) (significance of regional considerations); Smookler v. Wheatfield Township, 394 Mich. 574,
232 N.W.2d 616 (1975) (exclusion of trailer homes); Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35
Mich. Ct. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (1971) (same); Save a Neighborhood Env't v. City
of Seattle, 101 Wash. 2d 280, 676 P.2d 1006 (1984) (rezoning for affordable housing
serves general welfare). See generally 3 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING
LAW §§ 66.62-.81 (rev. ed. 1985).
90. See generally 3 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 89, § 66.83.
91. Under many circumstances, exclusionary zoning may violate the Fair Housing
Act of 1968, tit. VIII, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988)), because of the disproportionate need minority groups
have for low- and moderate-income housing. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v.
Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 488 U.S. 15 (1988).
92. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
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C. There Is a Consistent ConstitutionalTheme which Ties Together
These Factual and Legal Developments Around the
Nation
As indicated in Point 111(B) above, in the 1970s the courts in many
states - including most of the major states with the most experience in
land use controls - have taken a strong position against exclusionary
land use devices. The basic reason for this striking change of position
is simple enough: it finally became quite clear that under the judicial
laissez-faire policies so prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s, the function
of land use controls had been transformed. The system began as a device to protect residential and natural resource areas from the hustle
and bustle of commercial and industrial activity; now it was also being
used as a means of excluding large groups of the population from many
of the benefits of modem civilization - access to good affordable housing, the best new jobs, and good schools.
The rules prevailing in the large body of anti-exclusionary zoning
law of the 1970s and 1980s may be summarized as follows:
1. Housing is, of course, one of the prime necessities of life, along
with food and clothing. Moreover, with the ubiquity of state-imposed
land use controls in modem times (208 of 234 municipalities in New
Hampshire) the state controls access to housing to a greater extent
than any other basic need.93 Any legal rule whose intent and/or effect
is to exclude large groups of the population from access to good housing does not deserve, and has not been granted, the presumption of
validity normally accorded to public regulations of private activity.
2. By universal agreement, documented in innumerable studies all
over the world, the provision of affordable housing normally requires
some access to land for mobile or manufactured homes and/or some
form of multiple housing. Merely raising the permitted density for new
housing may be a prerequisite to success in this respect, but taken by
itself it does not insure success unless simultaneous controls are placed
on affordability. The result otherwise may be merely the enrichment of
the builder (and it is the builder who gets to choose).
3. Most land use controls are concerned with problems of purely
local concern - what use on which block - and are properly evaluated in that context. However, some land use controls affect the availa93. See Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. 158, 209, 456 A.2d 390, 415 (1983) ("The basis for
the constitutional obligation is simple: the State controls the use of land, all of the
land.") (emphasis by the court).
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bility of facilities which serve an entire region or subregion, or where
the market is regional in scope.
4. In the case of the latter type of controls, their validity must be
evaluated in terms of their contribution to the regional general welfare.
The considerations involved in such an analysis are similar to those
involved in equal protection cases. The underlying basic principles are
the same: if a governmental body decides to use public regulations
such as planning and zoning, it must employ them on behalf of the
welfare of all sectors of the population.94 The state courts, however,
true to their long tradition of keeping tight control over land use law,
have phrased the leading decisions in the framework of "regional general welfare" rather than equal protection. By doing so, the general
proposition in American law on police power regulation of private activity - that to be valid, such restrictions must promote the public
health, safety and general welfare - has been transformed to impose
responsibilities on towns as well as to give them more power.
This doctrine finds textual support in various constitutional phrasings in different states. In New Jersey, the lead state at present, the
source was the "general welfare" requirement of the New Jersey Con9
stitution, article I, paragraph L"
In New Hampshire, it is part II,
article 5 of the Constitution (power "to make.., all manner of wholesome and reasonable.., laws.., for the benefit and welfare of this
state").9 6 At base, however, the regional general welfare doctrine is
derived from the inherent nature of the constitutional order. Justice
Tobriner of the California Supreme Court best expressed the "general
welfare" doctrine when he stated:
[I]f a restriction significantly affects residents of surrounding communities, the constitutionality of the restriction must be measured
by its impact not only upon the welfare of the enacting community, but upon the welfare of the surrounding region. The present
ordinance ... significantly affects the interests of non-residents
who are not represented in the city legislative body and cannot
vote on a city initiative. [Justice Tobriner then criticized the traditional view of the general welfare approach, quoted supra note
94. See Southern Alameda County Spanish Speaking Org. v. City of Union City,
424 F.2d 291, 295-96 (9th Cir. 1970); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanma, 318 F. Supp. 669, 696-97 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
95. See Mount LaurelI, 67 N.L 151, 174-75, 336 A.2d 713, 725 (1975).
96. See Soucy v. State, 127 N.H. 451, 506 A.2d 288 (1985) (source of the police
power).
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77.] These considerations impel us to the conclusion that the
proper constitutional test is one which inquires whether the ordinance reasonably relates to the welfare of those whom it significantly affects. If its impact is limited to the city boundaries, the
inquiry may be limited accordingly; if, as alleged here, the ordinance may strongly influence the supply and distribution of housing for an entire metropolitan region,
judicial inquiry must
9
consider the welfare of that region. p
5. Estimating future regional need for various levels and types of
housing is a standard and quite familiar practice for trained housing
economists. The practice involves consideration of demographic
trends, projections of future employment, and so forth. The more difficult job, involving assumptions on major questions of public policy,
comes in the allocation of regional need to specific municipalities. Yet
in devising an effective remedy for a violation of constitutional rights,
some mechanism is necessary to carry out the "fair share" principle, as
adopted in other states.9"
A numerical fair share is obviously necessary to inform a town of
what it must do. It also serves the equally important need of informing
the town what it need not do. Under the fair share approach, each
community knows the maximum limit on the local duty to accept inexpensive, higher-density housing. Consequently, a town which provides
for a substantial amount of higher density affordable housing will not,
just for that reason, be forced to continue permitting much more such
housing indefinitely. 99 This approach is of crucial importance not only
because it is fair, but because in doctrinal terms it sharply limits the
involvement of the courts in what might otherwise be regarded as "legislative" matters, and because in practical terms it makes compliance
easier to "sell" to reluctant municipalities.
6. Experience with anti-exclusionary judicial policy has gone furthest in New Jersey, which was originally the most overtly exclusion97. Associated Home Builders of Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18
Cal. 3d 582, 607, 557 P.2d 473, 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 55 (1976).
98. See, e.g., AMG Realty Co. v. Township of Warren, 207 N.J. Super. 388, 504
A2d 692 (Law Div. 1984).
99. As Chief Justice Wilentz observed:
Mount Laurel is not an indiscriminate broom designed to sweep away all distinctions in the use of land. Municipalities may continue to reserve areas for upper
income housing, may continue to require certain community amenities in certain
areas, may continue to zone with some regard to their fiscal obligations ... provided that they have otherwise complied with their Mount Laurel obligations.
Mount Laurel H, 92 N.J. 158, 260, 456 A.2d 390, 442 (1983).
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ary state. As a result of the court's firm stand, and of the near chaos
resulting from wholesale reliance on the "builder's remedy," the New
Jersey Legislature finally took charge and created a new state agency to
handle the problem on a fair share basis. 1" There have, of course,
been compromises, but the result is that the critical decisions are now
made by a new state agency staffed by competent professionals - just
what the court had urged in the two Mount Laurel decisions. While
the New Hampshire situation is of course different, the court should
nevertheless handle the Chester case in a manner which encourages the
legislature to take charge.
8. Exclusionary towns often point to the fiscal system as the reason
for their anti-social policies. Specifically, these towns argue that the
heavy dependence on local real property taxes to fund public services,
particularly education, drives them directly to exclusionary action in
order to prevent "bad ratables," or those which are thought to require
a lot of services without bringing in much taxes. Indeed, it is sometimes argued that if public action in effect subsidizes a course of action,
as it does here, then such action really could not possibly violate constitutional norms. Actually, to the extent that the alleged relationships
do exist, the argument proves just the opposite. The reliance on local
real property taxes is clearly another form of what is unmistakably
governmental action, and in the real world contributes directly to unconstitutional discrimination.
IV.

A.

IT IS POSSIBLE FOR THE COURT TO FASHION AN EFFECTIVE
REMEDY THAT WILL VINDICATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF LOWER INCOME PLAINTIFFS AND
ENCOURAGE AN APPROPRIATE
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE

The Solution to the Exclusionary Zoning Problem Is Rightfully a
Legislative One

Ideally, this court should encourage state and local legislative bodies
to find a solution to the exclusionary zoning problem because these
bodies have the constitutional power to make discretionary policy
choices that are beyond the competence of the court. By the same token, however, plaintiffs are entitled to immediate vindication of their
100. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to 329 (West 1986). See Franzese, Mount
Laurel II: The New Jersey Supreme Court's Judicious Retreat, 18 SETON HALL L.
Rv. 30 (1988).
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constitutional rights, and the APA's study of the experience to date
confirms that voluntary compliance will come only after a period of
vigorous judicial enforcement.
We do not seek to understate the herculean proportions of this task.
As explained in Point II above, the fixed structure of state and local
government, in New Hampshire as elsewhere, magnifies local exclusionary preferences and neutralizes the state's ability to impose a
broader perspective. Judicial enforcement of constitutional principles
is the only way that this stalemate can be broken. As the Mount Laurel II court put it:
[W]hile we have always preferred legislative to judicial action in
this field, we shall continue - until the Legislature acts - to do
our best to uphold the constitutional obligation that underlies the
Mount Laurel doctrine. That is our duty. We may not build
houses, but we do enforce the constitution. 0 1
Faced with inevitable legislative inaction, however, the courts find
themselves an infelicitous forum. Because judges are not empowered
to make policy, they must rely on the "objective" testimony presented
to them by planners and other experts, searching for "truth" when wisdom is the more salient quality. The necessary trial-type proceedings
threaten to bog down in complexity and it is almost impossible to
achieve the flexible give and take which characterizes legislative
proceedings.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's approach to this dilemma has two
aspects and merits careful study. First, the court utilized existing policy-oriented plans, so that any necessary judicial orders implemented
rather than usurped the political process. New Jersey's use of the State
Development Guide Plan eliminated a vast amount of difficulty the
courts had in deciding which municipalities had to comply under
Mount Laurel 1.12 New Hampshire's regional planning process, discussed in Part III(A), is well established at this point, and has already
resulted in the development of fair share plans. Subject to review for
constitutional adequacy, this court should give all feasible deference to
these plans.
The second aspect of the Mount LaurelII approach was to fashion
relatively stringent remedies that transferred a significant amount of
discretionary control from municipalities to courts and builder-plain101. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 352, 456 A.2d at 490.
102. Id. at 223, 456 A.2d at 422.
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tiffs because of the failure of voluntary compliance. 103 Voluntary compliance should be encouraged and it is possible, of course, that
compliance will be more readily forthcoming in New Hampshire than
in New Jersey. Should that not be the case, however, the court must
make clear that strong, judicially enforced remedies will be used.
B.

There Are a Number of Remedies Available to the Courts which
Remain within the Competence of the Judiciarybut which
Will Encourage a More Comprehensive
Legislative Solution

Given the likelihood that a strong remedy will be necessary in a
number of New Hampshire communities, the court should modify the
remedies ordered in this case to insure that housing progress does not
inadvertently harm other planning values.
1. Total Invalidation of the Ordinance is Rarely Appropriate
Totally enjoining the operation of the zoning ordinance may be an
effective threat that would induce compliance with the constitutional
obligation, not only in Chester but in other exclusionary municipalities.
The cost of achieving compliance this way will almost always be too
great. However, if individual New Hampshire communities were to
remain unzoned for even brief periods, inappropriate uses would gain
vested rights that could not be undone, thereby1 saddling
future genera4
tions with the costs of this generation's folly. 0
Moreover, as Justice Brennan stated in San Diego Gas & Electric Co.
v. City of San Diego, 105 "[i]nvalidation hardly prevents enactment 0of6
'1
subsequent unconstitutional regulations by the government entity."
Justice Brennan quoted a California city attorney giving vivid professional advice to colleagues at a conference:
103. See supra Point III(C)(6).
104. This solution also employs what might be called the "candy store fallacy." A
parent who sends a five-year-old into a grocery store with a five dollar bill to buy breakfast, with a clear admonishment not to buy candy, may be enormously surprised at the
number of things in the store that are not candy but that mom or dad would not want to
eat for breakfast. Similarly, a court simply striking down one action of a local government may, if it observes the continuing process, be astonished at the candy store full of
equally unacceptable alternatives available to a creative local government.
105. 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 655 n.22.
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IF ALL ELSE FAILS, MERELY AMEND THE REGULATION AND START OVER AGAIN.
If ... you try the case and lose, don't worry about it. All is not

lost .... [C]hange the regulation in question, even after trial and
judgment, make it more reasonable, more restrictive, or whatever,
and everybody starts over again. See how easy it is to be a City
Attorney. Sometimes you can lose the battle and still win the war.
Good luck.10 7
Mount Laurel II held that ordinance invalidation was a possible
remedy, but it has never been used. Instead, the courts have on a
number of occasions issued a temporary injunction against approval of
unvested land use applications such as preliminary subdivision approval, and in at least one particularly flagrant instance against issuance of any building permits. This procedure is now embodied in
Section 5:91-11.1 of New Jersey's Administrative Code. Because this
approach prevents rather than permits land development, it does not
have the same potential for creating permanent harm to the
community.
2.

Fair Share Methodologies Are Readily Available but Should Be
Used Flexibly

Fair share methodologies are readily available and all quite similar,
although seemingly small statistical changes can produce quite different results.1 08 The advantage of the formulaic approach is that it tells
municipalities the exact limit of their constitutional obligation. The
disadvantage is that the formula cannot be expected to incorporate all
the tiny variables that make each town different, and it sometimes produces inappropriate results that engender widespread municipal hostility and fear.1 9
Fair share numbers should be used as a guide, but the court should
make clear that the formulaic result is to be adjusted, up or down,
107. Id. (quoting Longtin, Avoiding and Defending ConstitutionalAttacks on Land
Use RegulationsIncluding Inverse Condemnation, 38B NIMLO MUN. L. REv. 192-93
(1975)).
108. Compare AMG Realty Co. v. Township of Warren, 207 N.J. Super. 388, 504
A.2d 692 (Law Div. 1984) with N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 5:92 (Supp. 1986) (Technical Appendix). See generally D. LISTOKIN, FAIR SHARE HOUSING ALLOCATION

(Rutgers Center for Urban Policy Research 1976) for a discussion of fairshare allocation methodologies.
109. For one such New Jersey example, see Payne, Rethinking FairShare: The Judicial Enforcement of Affordable Housing Policies, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 20 (1987) (fair
share of 816 in a town with less than 800 existing dwelling units).
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upon an individualized examination of each municipality's capacity to
absorb new affordable housing or rehabilitate existing substandard
housing. This added flexibility should make the formulaic approach,
and hence the court's constitutional doctrine, more acceptable to municipalities, without falling into the unenforceable "numberless" approach of the Oakwood case.11° The court should rely on existing New
Hampshire fair share methodologies, such as the one developed by the
Office of State Planning."' It should also encourage, as did the New
Jersey court, the use of masters to work with the parties in a nonadjudicative setting to formulate compliance plans.112 This approach
can significantly reduce the procedural formalism of trial-type proceed13
ings that often frustrates efforts to reach sensible compromise.)
3. The "Builder's Remedy" Should Be Retained but Subordinated
to Mechanisms That Encourage Primary Litigation by
Public Interest Plaintiffs
The "builder's remedy" is typically the most controversial aspect of
an exclusionary zoning case.
a. Distinguishingthe Substantive and ProceduralDimensions
of the "Builder'sRemedy"
In its substantive dimension, the "builder's remedy" refers to a technique for providing lower income housing by allowing development at
110. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d
1192 (1977). If specific fair share numbers are not developed, the court would have to
provide some other guidelines in its order. At a minimum, it should find:
in general, a community in this area offering a diversity of housing types would be
expected to have at least X% of its residential land zoned for apartments, at least
another X% zoned for residences on lots of one-quarter acre or less, and at least
another X% zoned for residences on half-acre or less lots.
This form of order that would provide more specific guidance than a simple invalidation
of the ordinance without placing the court in the position of a super-legislature. But see
supra Point III(B)(4).
Ill. See Letter from David G. Scott to Regional Planning Directors (Apr. 19,
1988) (discussing regional housing needs and fairshare housing proposals).
112. New Jersey's administrative approach now includes a pre-hearing mediation
phase. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-315 (West 1986).
113. For one example of successful use of a master by a Mount Laurel trial judge,
see AMG Realty Co. v. Township of Warren, 207 N.J. Super 388, 394-97, 504 A.2d
692, 695-96 (Law Div. 1984) (master-supervised planners conference to develop "consensus" on fair share methodology). See also Rice, ExclusionaryZoning: Mount Laurel
in New York?, 6 PACE L. REV. 135 (1986).
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relatively high densities (eight units per acre or more, in the typical

case) in exchange for a commitment from the builder to set aside at
least twenty percent of the resulting units at affordable prices, usually
well below market levels. It is a "builder's remedy" in the sense that
the builder's provision of the low cost units pursuant to a municipal
ordinance provides the remedy for the town's violation of the constitution. The "builder's remedy" in this substantive context is often referred to as "inclusionary zoning."1' 14
There is an alternate procedural dimension, however, in which the

"builder's remedy" refers to a successful builder-plaintiff's right to
build a specific development with low-income housing in it, by court

order and without regard to whether the site chosen has been zoned by
the municipality for such housing. This "remedy" is really a reward

that provides developers an incentive to undergo the trouble and expense of litigation that vindicates the rights of poor people. Absent this

provision, the town could come into compliance with the constitution
by zoning other sites, thus cutting the builder-plaintiff out of the fruits
of its labor. 115

b. Overreliance on the "Builder's Remedy" Can Cause
Problems
Both dimensions of the "builder's remedy" are necessary components of an exclusionary zoning remedy, but each must be used with
care. Substantively, "inclusionary zoning" may often be the only practical way to develop new affordable housing, given the paucity of state
and federal subsidy money available. 1 6 At a ratio of four market rate
114. See generally A. MALLACH, INCLUSIONARY HOUSING PROGRAMS: POLICIES
AND PRACTICES (Rutgers Center for Urban Policy Research 1984).
115. The "builder's remedy" has been most thoroughly developed in the New
Jersey courts. In Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371
A.2d 1192 (1977), the New Jersey high court held that a local ordinance was clearly
exclusionary, based on overly large minimum lot sizes (one acre and two acre), excessive
fees and other regulatory limitations. The court acknowledged the enormous burden of
costs and time assumed by the developer in pursuing the case through five years of
litigation and ordered that the developer's project be approved as submitted. The
court's approach to the issue was as much a way of compensating a private party for
pursuing the public good (a private attorney general theory) as a method of directly
righting the wrong, although the order was designed to accomplish both. The other
significant case, of course, is Mount LaurelII. Reflecting the court's enormous frustration with the town's dismal "progress" in correcting the exclusionary effects of its ordinance, the opinion squarely adopted, and basically ordered lower courts to use, the
"builder's remedy" as part of a package of remedies.
116. See, eg., Lamar, Mallach & Payne, supra note 69, at 1210.

HeinOnline -- 40 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 37 1991

38

JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW

[Vol. 40:3

units to each affordable unit, however, this approach risks overbuilding
that may be inappropriate from a planning perspective in some locations or communities.
This risk is reinforced by the procedural dimension of the "builder's
remedy." There can be no doubt that it provides an effective incentive
which stimulates constitutional litigation on behalf of the poor."' This
spectacular success, however, contains the seeds of its difficulties. As
more and more builders come forward, inclusionary zoning increasingly becomes the only remedy that a municipality or a court can consider, because it is the only one that satisfies the builder-plaintiff's
claim. This costs the municipality the opportunity to choose other remedial approaches, such as rehabilitations, municipal-sponsored developments, linkage programs, and so forth. In the extreme case, it can
overwhelm even the best efforts to preserve a rational planning
process. 118
117. See Mallach, supra note 72, at 119 (140 builder suits in New Jersey).
118. See J.W. Field Co. v. Franklin Township, 204 N.J. Super. 445, 499 A.2d 251
(Law Div. 1985) (11 builder's remedy-plaintiffs in one municipality).
Other state courts have embraced the policy of project-specific relief. In the famous
Pennsylvania case, Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970), the court had
held that the lack of zoning for new apartments in the township was invalid exclusionary zoning, but it did not order site-specific relief. The town rezoned a quarry for apartments rather than plaintiff's land. In the subsequent case of Willistown Township v.
Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466 (1975) the town sought to avoid
Girsh by rezoning land other than the plaintiffs' while the litigation was pending. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court ultimately ordered approval of the developer's specific
proposal.
The New York Court of Appeals also approved very specific remedies in Berenson:
approval of multi-family housing on the Berenson property at a specified density; a
specific numerical goal for the total number of multi-family units to be permitted by the
town by a specified date; and a holding that the presumption of validity would be suspended if the specific remedies were not fulfilled by the town, thus allowing the courts to
award specific relief for each proposed development. See Comment, 31 LAND UsE L. &
ZONING DIG. No. 7, at 5 (July 1979); cf. Charles v. Diamond, 41 N.Y.2d 318, 360
N.E.2d 1295, 392 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1977), where the technical evidence justified the town's
sewer moratorium but the court was frustrated by the obviously dilatory approach of
the town toward curing the problem. It fashioned an ingenious equitable remedy, exempting the developer from the requirement that it connect to public sewer, thus leaving it with the option of proposing a package plant or devising some other alternative
treatment system.
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c. Encouraging Public Interest Litigation Can Avoid OverReliance on the "Builder's Remedy"
These tangles can be eased by careful judicial management,1 19 but a
better way, we submit, is to encourage direct representation of lowincome households by private counsel or public interest offices such as
legal services. This way, the litigation will not be tied to any particular
site and the court and all the parties will have much more flexibility to
seek the best solution from a planning perspective, not merely a tolerable one. This is not to say, of course, that builders should be frozen out
of the process. Where the builder genuinely carries the burden of litigation in the absence of, or in substantial cooperation with, a direct
representative of the plaintiff poor, and there are adequate assurances
that the "builder's remedy" will include a significant amount of affordable housing for low- and moderate-income families on a site that
meets satisfactory planning and environmental standards, the
"builder's remedy" should be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Because it is an amicus curiae, APA as a matter of policy expresses
no opinion on whether the builder in this case would meet the criteria
for a "builder's remedy." We note, however, that as a form of equitable relief, the egregiousness of the town's actions is an important consideration in determining whether to grant a "builder's remedy;" the
less egregious, the more equity the builder ought to show to prevail in a
request for a builder's remedy.
Even when formal award of a "builder's remedy" is not appropriate,
it is important to understand that the willingness of a builder to undertake a development containing low- and moderate-income units may
still be a crucial part of an exclusionary zoning suit. To be in constitutional compliance, a municipality must have a realistic plan for lowand moderate-income housing. 1" Normally, the municipality should
be required to rezone suitable sites that it knows are controlled by a
ready, willing and able developer. Moreover, this developer should
more often than not participate in compliance negotiations, even without formal party status. The developer still has a profit motivation to
participate in the process, but does not incur the full financial burden
of the litigation and, most importantly, does not tie the hands of the
parties if a better solution is available to them.
119.

See J.W. Field Co. v. Franklin Township, 204 N.J. Super. 445, 499 A.2d 251

(Law Div. 1985).
120. See Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. 158, 214, 456 A.2d 390, 418 (1983).
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4. Attorney's Fees and Other Remedies
To make this suggested approach work, recovery of attorney's fees
and costs must be available to the public interest parties. Neither private attorneys nor underfunded public agencies can be expected to
tackle complicated exclusionary zoning cases without such a recovery.
Keeping in mind that the "builder's remedy" incentive is essentially a
method of compensating (indeed, often over-compensating) the
builder-plaintiff, there is nothing extraordinary about compensating
non-builder plaintiffs directly. The municipality concerned about these
costs can avoid them, of course, by immediate voluntary compliance.
Indeed, payment out of current revenues is a more effective chastisement of recalcitrant officials than is an award of a building permit for
an awkward location that may affect the community for years to come.
To the same end, the court should reconsider the implication of
Soares, that attorney's fees and costs are not appropriate where the
satisfactory revision of the ordinance occurs without formal court order. Borrowing from federal law, the rule should be that the party is
entitled to a reasonable recovery if its efforts produced the favorable
21
result, whether by settlement, court order or other mechanism.'
Finally, we note other parts of the package of remedies that were
employed in Mount Laurel II, in addition to the "builder's remedy:"
(1) appointing special masters to help revise the regulations; (2) setting a general time goal of ninety days for compliance; and (3) retaining jurisdiction to ensure that effective remedies are implemented.
Communities that are inadvertently exclusionary will comply readily;
those which actively seek to be exclusionary will exhaust these gentle
remedies quickly and justify more stringent intervention by the court.
V.

CONCLUSION

For all of the above reasons, the amicus curiae American Planning
Association urges this court to:
1. REVERSE the trial court's decision that the whole ordinance shall
be voided;
2. REMAND to the trial court for reconsideration under the reasoning set forth above of the appropriate remedy, possibly to include:
A. invalidating a portion of the ordinances and regulations;
B. granting a "builder's remedy," if appropriate under the guidelines
set forth above; and
121.

See Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1319 (4th Cir. 1979).
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C. awarding attorney's fees and costs to the low-income plaintiffs
and, if appropriate, the builder-plaintiff.
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APPENDIX A
THE EXPANSION OF METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL
CASES
IN SOUTHERN NEW HAMPSHIRE
1960-80
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Source: 1960, 1970 and 1980 Censuses of Population,
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APPENDIX B
PERCENT GROWTH 1970-88
CHESTER AND NEIGHBORING TOWNS

1980-88
Chester
27.1
Auburn
40.6
Candia
45.1
Derry
42.1
47.0
Fremont
46.6
Raymond
77.4
Sandown
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1980 Census of Population,
Characteristics of Population, New Hampshire, PC 80-1-A-31, Table
5a; id., 1988 Population and 1987 Per Capita Income Estimates for
Counties and Incorporated Places, Current Population Reports, Series
P-26, 88-NE-SC, Table 1 (1990).
Town

1970-80
45.2
41.7
49.7
61.2
34.2
81.6
177.6
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APPENDIX C
ANALYSIS OF CHESTER LAND USE ORDINANCES
ACCORDING TO EXCLUSIONARY ZONING CRITERIA
Williams & Norman Criteria
1. Exclusion of multiple-family
dwellings. For lower income
householders, apartments are the
major source of affordable shelter. Exclusion devices:
*

total prohibition

permitted, but only after discretionary rezoning
* permitted, but only as a special exception or conditional use.
These discretionary devices create a series of impassable hurdles-what has been called
"maximum amplified delay"-to
wear down developers by whipsawing them through the application of subjective decisionmaking criteria.
*

2. Restrictions on the number
of bedrooms. The practice of
restricting the maximum number
of bedrooms per dwelling to one
or two typically applies only to
apartments and stands in stark
contrast to the policy of encouraging large, single-family dwellings.
Poorer families are
assumed to make relatively small
property tax contributions but
have larger number of children
who will burden school budgets.
3. Prohibition
of
Mobile
Homes. The most inexpensive

Chester Ordinances
1. Multi-family dwellings not
permitted as a matter of right;
no land has been zoned anywhere in the town for them.
* Permitted only as part of a
Planned Residential District
which also includes other uses,
such as single-family housing.
Chester Zoning Ordinance,
§ 6.2.2.2.
* Obtaining a permit for a
mixed use project which includes
multifamily is a lengthy, subjective special use permit approval
process. Chester Zoning Ordinance, § 6. See Master's Report,
185-88, June 20, 1989.
* Prohibition on conversion of a
single-family dwelling to a
duplex structure if both units are
designed to be occupied by renters. One unit must be owneroccupied. Chester Zoning Ordinance, § 9.2.5.-Residency.
2. Maximum bedroom average
is 1.5 for multi-family units.
Chester Zoning Ordinance, §
6.2.5.
* Planned Residential Development provisions explicitly discourage apartments with more
than this average. Chester Zoning Ordinance, § 6.4.7.
* No restrictions are placed on
the maximum number of bedrooms in single-family houses.
* See Note, infra.
3. Mobile home parks are not
permitted.
Master's Report,
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APPENDIX C (cont'd)
Analysis of Chester Ordinances

housing available in many communities in the path of urbanization is mobile/manufactured
housing.
Ordinances
either
totally prohibit or severe limit
the locations where such housing
is permitted.

supra, at 191.
* Manufactured housing permitted only in the MH-1 and MH-2
Districts; in the entire 26 square
miles of developable land, only
23 mobile homes were in place in
1986, an increase of only 3 since
1970. Master's Report, supra, at
157, 159.

4. Lot area requirements. Very
large minimum sizes for various
property dimensions result in
substantially higher total housing costs. Extraordinary lot size
requirements, particularly when
coupled with excessive frontages,
may result in a considerable
addition to housing costs.

4. Minimum lot size of two
acres on conventional singlefamily developments.
* A Planned Residential Development (PRD) may have smaller
individual lots, as long as the
overall density within the area is
consistent with the two-acre
minimum. But
* The minimum size for a PRD
is 20 acres in single ownership, a
very large amount of land for a
developer to assemble. Chester
Zoning Ordinance, Table of
Dimensional and Area Requirements, 26; § 6.2.3.1.
* No provision for reduction of
minimum lot sizes where septic
percolation is adequate or package plants available, making
large lots unnecessary. Chester
Zoning Ordinance, § 4.3.
frontage
5. The minimum
requirement is 430 feet for a
PRD. Chester Zoning Ordinance, § 6.2.3.2.
* The principle dwelling unit to
set at least 300 feet from the
front property line (necessitating
the construction of a lengthy
driveway to reach the main
building) and 75 feet from the

5. Minimum lot width requirements. An owner typically
incurs the costs of site development based on the length of the
property along the street. The
larger the minimum lot width or
frontage requirement, the greater
the cost to the property owner
for sidewalks, curbs, gutters,
street pavement, water lines, san-
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APPENDIX C (cont'd)
Analysis of Chester Ordinances
itary and storm sewers, and
of
site
other
elements
development.

6. Minimum building size
requirements. Since the cost of
housing is directly related to
size, requirements for a larger
of the
house-independent
number of occupants-have an
obvious and direct impact on
housing costs.
Source: William & Norman,
ExclusionaryLand Use Controls:
The Case of Northeastern New
Jersey, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv.
475, 481-84.

side lot lines.
* The side yards must include a
50 foot wide planted buffer area;
no provision for reducing the
size of the side yard depending
on the density of the plantings or
the provision of other types of
visual screens. Chester Zoning
Ordinance, § 6.2.6.3-.4.
6. Dwelling unit size must be
at least 600 square feet, regardless of the number of occupants
and the size of the basement. No
distinction among room types in
the allocation of floor area
within the dwelling, particularly
to bedrooms. Chester Zoning
Ordinance, § 4.12.
Sources: Chester Zoning Ordinance; Master's Report, Britton
v. Town of Chester, No. 85-3-352
Superior
(New
Hampshire
Court, June 20, 1989).
Note: Paradoxically, since a
purpose of zoning in New
Hampshire is to relieve or prevent overcrowding, restrictions
on the number of bedrooms in an
apartment serve to compel lowand moderate-income families,
who may have limited rental
housing choices, to live in overcrowded conditions. Thus, such
restrictions may violate enabling
legislation. See RSA 674:17(e),
(f).
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APPENDIX D
TABLE I.

TOTAL NUMBER OF UNITS IN AFFORDABLE
HOUSING ELEMENTS: UNITS COMPLETED,
UNDER DEVELOPMENT OR PROPOSED SETASIDE DEVELOPMENTS AND OTHER METHODS

Totals Included in Housing Elements *

Set-Aside Developments
Other Methods
Subtotal:
Regional Contribution Agreements
TOTAL
Total Completed or Under Development *
In Set-Aside Developments
Completed
Under Construction
Approved
Pending
Total Set-Aside
Other Methods
Completed
Under Construction
Approved
Pending
Total Other Methods
All Methods Combined
Completed
Under Construction
Approved
Pending
TOTAL COMBINED

Number

Percent **

16,819
5,854
22,703
813
23,516

74.2
25.8
100.0
n/a
n/a

2,101
2,123
2,981
4,512
11,717

9.2
9.3
13.1
19.8
51.6

729
134
275
1,108
2,246

3.2
0.5
1.2
4.8
9.8

2,830
2,257
3,256
5,620
13,963

12.5
9.9
14.3
24.7
61.6

Total Proposed
In Set-Aside Developments
5,132
22.6
Other Methods
3,608
15.8
TOTAL PROPOSED
8,740
38.4
* The questionnaire design reported only the total number of
rehabilitated units included in affordable housing elements and does
not permit allocation of these units between completed, under
development, and proposed. Because of omissions in reporting, the
total number of units accounted for in the allocation between
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APPENDIX D (cont'd)
Table L (cont'd)
completed, under development, and proposed is slightly less than the
total number of units included in housing elements.
** All percentages based upon the total count of 22,703 units, which
excludes the 813 units transferred under RCAs to other communities.
Excluding them from the percentage calculations gives a more realistic
picture of the housing strategies municipalities pursue within their own
boundaries.
Source: Lamar, Mallach & Payne, Mount Laurelat Work Affordable
Housing in New Jersey, 1983-1988, 41 RUTGERS L. REv. 1197, 1210
(1989).

HeinOnline -- 40 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 48 1991

